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Abstract
We identify 133 firms that between July and December 2002, announced plans to
voluntarily adopt the fair value method of accounting for stock-based compensation. We
investigate whether such announcements increased the quality of these firms’ earnings as
perceived by market participants. Answering this research question not only provides evidence
relevant to the debate surrounding the expensing of employee stock options, but doing so
provides evidence that conservative accounting choices in general lead to higher perceived
earnings quality. Using two measures of earnings quality, the price-earnings relation and the
earnings response coefficient, we find evidence consistent with an increase in perceived earnings
quality for these firms relative to a control set of firms that in 2002 did not announce plans to
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I. Introduction
We identify 133 firms (hereinafter referred to as “recognizing firms”) that between July
and December, 2002, announced plans to voluntarily adopt the fair value method of accounting
for stock-based compensation.1 The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of such
announcements on the recognizing firms’ earnings quality. Specifically, we investigate whether
announcements to adopt the fair value method increased the recognizing firms’ earnings quality
as perceived by market participants. We also investigate whether firms that had previously used
the fair value method to value executive stock option grants disclosed in proxy statements
experienced a greater increase in perceived earnings quality relative to firms that had not used
the fair value method for proxy statement disclosure purposes.
Accounting for employee stock options (ESOs) has sparked considerable debate in recent
years. APB 25 (APB, 1973) generally requires firms to record ESO expense only if the market
value of the stock on the grant date exceeds the exercise price. Because ESOs typically have an
exercise price at least equal to the stock price on the date of grant, and thus no intrinsic value,
firms typically report little or no APB 25 ESO expense. In 1993, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) issued an exposure draft (FASB, 1993), which required firms to value
ESOs at the grant date using a fair value method (e.g., Black-Scholes) and recognize ESO
1

Our search resulted in a potential sample of 150 firms, but we eliminate from our study nine foreign firms, five
firms with missing data, and three firms that switched yearends. Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (2004a) identify 155
firms that announced plans to recognize ESO expense in 2002 and early 2003. 134 (21) of their sample firms made
their announcements in 2002 (2003). We focus only on the 2002 announcers because we investigate the earnings
quality of post-announcement earnings.
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expense over the options’ vesting periods. In 1995, the FASB succumbed to considerable
political pressure and in its final standard, SFAS 123, backed away from requiring firms to
recognize ESO expense using the fair value method (FASB, 1995). Instead, SFAS 123 makes
recognition of ESO expense using the fair value method optional and requires non-recognizing
firms to disclose in the financial statement footnotes earnings per share amounts calculated as if
the fair value method had been used.2
In 2002, the debate over ESO accounting resumed following a number of highlypublicized accounting scandals that were blamed, at least in part, on the incentives created by
executive stock options (e.g., Becker, 2002). From July through December of 2002, the 133
recognizing firms announced that they would begin recognizing ESO expense according to the
fair value method outlined in SFAS 123. Aboody, Barth and Kasznik (2004a) (hereinafter
ABK) identify 155 firms that made such announcements in 2002 and early 2003 and found that
the recognizing firms experienced positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates and
argue that the voluntary adoption of SFAS 123 signals higher earnings quality. The positive
stock price effects documented in ABK (2004a), however, are not a function of the recognizing
firms’ earnings. In this study, we investigate whether the recognizing firms’ signals – the
voluntary adoption of the fair value method of accounting for ESOs – enhanced their perceived
earnings quality. We link the recognizing firms’ positive stock price effects to their reported
earnings and thus triangulate the findings in ABK (2004a).
We use the value relevance of earnings as a surrogate for earnings quality (e.g., Schipper
and Vincent, 2003) and test whether the recognizing firms’ value relevance of earnings,
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Aboody, Barth and Kasznik (2004a) report that only five publicly-traded firms chose to recognize ESO expense in
the income statement prior to 2002. Accordingly, 133 firms announcing plans to do so represents a substantial
increase in the number of firms recognizing ESO expense and suggests a fundamental change in the financial
reporting environment.

2

measured using both the price-earnings multiple and earnings response coefficient, are greater in
the post-announcement period relative to the pre-announcement period. Importantly, we do not
test whether the ESO expense recognition pursuant to SFAS 123 improves earnings quality.
Rather, we test whether the announcements to recognize SFAS 123 ESO expense increased the
recognizing firms’ perceived earnings quality. Moreover, even though the evidence in ABK
(2004a) suggests that the recognizing firms are fundamentally than the non-recognizing firms,
our research design focuses on the recognizing firms’ increases in perceived earnings quality and
thus helps avoid selection bias issues.
Following Bagnoli and Watts (2004), we hypothesize that the impact of the
announcements to voluntarily recognize SFAS 123 ESO expense on the recognizing firms’ value
relevance of earnings is increasing in the informativeness of the fair value method of accounting
for ESOs. We assume that the fair value method is more (less) informative for firms that had
(had not) previously valued executive stock option grants in their proxy statements using the fair
value method. We argue that firms previously using the fair value method for proxy statement
reporting purposes are able to send a more credible signal of earnings quality to market
participants than those firms that had been not been using a fair value method for this purpose.
Our results are consistent with an increase in the recognizing firms’ perceived earnings
quality subsequent to their announcements to adopt the SFAS 123 recognition provisions. We
find that the recognizing firms’ price-earnings multiple and earnings response coefficient,
relative to a control set of firms that did not announce plans to recognize ESO expense in 2002,
increased significantly from the pre-announcement period to the post-announcement period. We
do not find, however, an incremental increase in the value relevance of earnings associated with
the prior use of the fair value method to value ESO grants disclosed in the recognizing firms’
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proxy statements. Overall, our results are consistent with the recognizing firms’ announcements
to voluntarily recognize ESO expense sending a credible signal of higher earnings quality to
market participants.
Our study makes several contributions. First, we add to the stream of research that
addresses voluntary accounting choices (see Fields, Lys and Vincent, 2001 for a review of this
literature). Using value relevance as the surrogate for earnings quality (e.g., Ghosh and Moon,
2005), we investigate whether the recognizing firms’ voluntary adoption of the fair value method
of accounting for ESOs led to higher perceived quality of earnings. Second, our research also
contributes to research that addresses disclosure versus recognition (e.g., Bernard and Schipper,
1994; Aboody, 1997; Barth, Clinch and Shibano, 2003; ABK, 2004b) because SFAS 123
requires disclosure of ESO expense and pro forma earnings per share when firms choose not to
recognize ESO expense in the income statement. Third, we add to the literature that addresses
the effects of conservative accounting choices (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2002). In contrast to prior
studies that examine accruals which reverse over time, the choice to recognize ESO expense
results in the persistent understatement of net income and thus provides a more powerful test of
the consequences of conservative accounting choices. Finally, our study contributes to the
stream of research addressing accounting for ESOs (e.g., Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 1996;
Espahbodi et al., 2002; ABK, 2004a; ABK, 2004b), a topic that is once again at the forefront of
the FASB’s agenda and the subject of considerable debate. We find that the announcements to
voluntarily recognize ESO expense are not only value relevant but that earnings quality is
enhanced. ABK (2004a) does not provide direct evidence that these announcements resulted in
higher earnings quality.

4

The paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops the hypotheses investigated in
this study. The third section presents the models and data utilized to test the hypotheses. Section
four provides the sample selection process, including the selection of a control group of firms
that did not voluntarily announce plans to recognize SFAS 123 expense in 2002. Section five
presents the results, and we conclude in section six.

II. Hypothesis Development
A key issue in the ongoing ESO accounting debate is whether mandating ESO expense
recognition would improve earnings quality. Investigating whether announcements to
voluntarily recognize ESO expense have increased the recognizing firms’ perceived earnings
quality will inform this debate. Evidence that market participants believe that such
announcements enhance a firm’s earnings quality would suggest to policymakers (e.g., the
FASB, SEC, Congress) that they believe ESO expense recognition should be mandated for all
firms.
The current ESO debate began in 2002 after several highly-publicized accounting
scandals severely impacted investor confidence and reignited calls for corporate financial
reporting reform. Placing a renewed emphasis on the importance of earnings quality,
shareholders, other members of the investment community, and regulators began to demand
increased transparency in corporate financial statements. In particular, the recent series of
corporate failures highlighted a need for reform and increased conservatism with regard to the
accounting rules for ESOs. For example, in an April, 2002 column written for the Washington
Post, Berkshire Hathaway CEO, Warren Buffet states “Companies that expense options will
develop a reputation for being believable, for not hyping things, and will be valued more than
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those whose CEO is flim-flamming [investors]” (Buffet, A19).3 During a May, 2002 Financial
Markets Conference of the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Federal Reserve Board Chairman,
Alan Greenspan, reiterated the need for enhanced transparency in financial statements and
implicated the non-recognition of stock-based compensation as a contributing factor to the
overall decline in earnings quality (Greenspan, 2002).
The press also reported estimates of the extent to which corporate earnings are overstated
as a result of ESO expense (generally) not being recognized. For example, in a special report
called “The Angry Market” published by Business Week, it was reported that U.S. companies
had overstated earnings by approximately 15 percent due to the non-recognition of ESO expense
and the underestimation of pension funding requirements (Henry, 2002). As evidence that ESO
expensing would have a greater effect on larger companies, this special report estimates that if all
firms in the S&P 500 had expensed their ESOs, earnings per share would have declined by 24
percent in 2001 and by 17 percent in 2002 (Vickers, 2002).
Both the FASB and International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) responded to
investor concerns and re-opened the stock option accounting debate. On February 19, 2004, the
IASB issued International Financial Reporting Standard 2 Share-Based Payment, mandating the
recognition of stock-based compensation expense using the fair value method (IASB, 2004). On
March 31, 2004, after reviewing comment letters from the public and undergoing lengthy
deliberations, the FASB issued Share-Based Payment, a proposed statement regarding the
accounting rules for stock-based compensation (FASB, 2004). The proposed statement would
eliminate the ability to account for ESO grants using the intrinsic value method under ABP 25,

3

Indeed, six of the seven companies for which Buffet is a director have since elected to voluntarily adopt the fair
value method of accounting for ESOs (ABK, 2004a).
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and would require firms to recognize stock-based compensation expense using the fair value
method.
Consistent with the debate surrounding SFAS 123 a decade ago, the FASB’s and IASB’s
actions have sparked heated debate. For example, Morgenson and Glater (2003) report that in its
comment letter to the FASB, TechNet, an organization headquartered in the Silicon Value
consisting of over 200 executives from companies in technology industries (e.g., software,
biotech, e-commerce), argues that stock options are “something of value to employees” but
asserted that the divergent views among accountants regarding the treatment of stock options as a
“corporate expense” serves as evidence that the FASB should maintain the status quo. “We
believe that requiring employee stock options to be treated as an expense would lead to
misleading financial statements because no accurate, reliable and tested method of valuing stock
options currently exists.”4 Similarly, Congress is also weighing in on the stock option
accounting debate. On July 20, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Stock
Option Accounting Reform Act (H.R. 3574), which impacts accounting for ESOs in several
ways, the most important of which limits mandatory expensing of ESOs to options granted to the
top executive and four other most highly paid executives.5
Two theoretical studies provide insights that a conservative accounting choice such as
expensing ESOs serves as a signal of higher earnings quality. Hughes and Levine (2003)
develop a signaling model in which there is an adverse selection problem between firms and
their creditors. High quality firms are able to choose a conservative accounting method and still
have earnings sufficient to avoid debt covenant violations and satisfy other accounting-based

4

For more information on Technet see Who are we? 2004 Membership List. [Online] Retrieved March 5, 2004 from
http://www.technet.org/who2/memberListName/
5
H.R. 3574 also requires that, if a fair value method such as Black-Scholes is used to value ESOs, assumed
volatility must be zero. This restriction would affect ESO values.
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contracts, whereas low quality firms are unable to mimic this strategy. The choice to recognize
ESO expense using the fair value method is a conservative accounting method because doing so
unambiguously results in lower net income.
Similarly, Bagnoli and Watts (2004) develop a signaling model in which managers trade
off the stock price benefits of reporting conservatively versus the costs of potentially missing
earnings expectations. They find a separating equilibrium in which “bad” firms report nonconservatively and “good” firms report conservatively. The intuition behind their result is that if
the “bad” firm reports conservatively, mimicking “good” firms, the benefit of a higher stock
price is outweighed by the costs of missing the firm’s earnings expectation. In contrast, if the
“good” firm reports non-conservatively, mimicking the “bad” firm, the benefit of beating the
firm’s earnings expectation is outweighed by the cost of a lower stock price.
Whereas Hughes and Levine (2003) and Bagnoli and Watts (2004) both provide
theoretical support for the argument that a conservative accounting choice signals higher quality
to financial statement users, the latter study also provides insights into the relation between
earnings conservatism and stock prices. Generally, Bagnoli and Watts show that a firm’s
earnings response coefficient, a surrogate for earnings quality (Schipper and Vincent, 2003), is
higher when it makes the conservative accounting choice.
Consistent with the signaling benefits of a conservative accounting choice, ABK (2004a)
provide evidence that the 155 firms in their sample that announced plans to voluntarily recognize
ESO expense did so to signal higher earnings quality and thus increase stock price. They find
that firms more active in the capital market, firms with greater information asymmetry
concerning the firms’ prospects, firms with top managers having a greater incentive to increase
stock prices, and larger firms with greater political costs were more likely to voluntarily adopt
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the SFAS 123 recognition provisions. Surprisingly, after controlling for other determinants,
ABK (2004a) find that even though the magnitude of the effect of expensing ESOs on the
recognizing firms’ earnings was immaterial, it played an insignificant role in firms’ decisions to
announce plans to recognize ESO expense.
ABK (2004a) also indirectly test whether firms’ announcements to voluntarily recognize
ESO expense signaled higher earnings quality to market participants. ABK (2004a) argue that
even though ESO expense is already disclosed in the footnotes, these announcements provide a
credible signal of earnings quality that lowers information asymmetry between the firm and
market participants. This reduced information asymmetry reduces the firm’s risk premium,
which, in turn, increases the firm’s stock price (e.g., Bartov and Bodnar, 1996). Consistent with
this argument, ABK (2004a) find that the recognizing firms experienced abnormal positive stock
returns around the announcement dates. The positive stock market reactions to the recognizing
firms’ announcements, however, are not a function of earnings. Accordingly, to more directly
investigate the earnings quality effects of these announcements, we test the following hypothesis
(stated in the alternative):
H1: Recognizing firms have higher perceived earnings quality after the announcements
of plans to voluntarily adopt the fair value method of accounting for ESOs than before
the announcements.
At the heart of the ESO accounting debate is whether current valuation methods can be
applied to ESOs (Morgenson and Glater, 2003). Since 1992, all publicly traded firms have had
an opportunity to choose the fair value method to value ESO grants disclosed in their proxy
statement filings. The 1992 proxy statement disclosure rules promulgated by the SEC give
management limited discretion in reporting the value of stock options granted to top executives
in the annual proxy statements. Firms can choose to report either the potential value of options
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granted assuming stock prices appreciate at 5 percent or 10 percent annually during the term of
the option (“potential realizable value method”), or the present value of options on the date of
grant estimated using the Black-Scholes model, a binomial model, or other accepted option
pricing model. Accordingly, firms have historically made the choice of whether fair value
methods are sufficiently reliable for their proxy statement ESO disclosures; i.e., firms that used
the present value method presumably believe that method is more reliable and thus more
informative than the potential realizable value method, and vice versa. We thus assume that the
fair value method is more informative for the recognizing firms that had previously valued
executive stock option grants in their proxy statements using the fair value method than for the
recognizing firms that had used the potential realizable value method. We argue that firms
previously using the fair value method for proxy statement reporting purposes are thus able to
send a more credible signal of earnings quality to market participants. Accordingly, this
discussion leads to our second hypothesis (stated in the alternative):
H2: Recognizing firms that use the present value method in their proxy statements will
have a greater increase in perceived earnings quality than the recognizing firms that use
the potential realizable value method in their proxy statements.

III. Research Design
In our investigation of the perceived earnings quality consequences of announcements to
voluntarily adopt the fair value method of accounting for ESOs, we use two value relevance
measures, the price-earnings multiple and the earnings response coefficient, as surrogates for
earnings quality (Schipper and Vincent, 2003). We first model the price-earnings relation as
follows:
MVEit = α0 + α1Eit + εit

(1)

where
10

MVEit = market value of common equity three months after fiscal year end (monthly
Compustat data item MKVALM) scaled by common shares outstanding (annual
Compustat data item CSHO) as of the beginning of the fiscal year;
Eit

= income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in
accounting principles (annual Compustat data item IB) scaled by the common
shares outstanding (annual Compustat item CSHO) as of the beginning of the
fiscal year; and

εit

= random disturbance term.

We do not adjust the recognizing firms’ post-announcement period earnings for
recognized SFAS 123 ESO expense because we use income before changes in accounting
principles as our earnings measure. Next, we revise equation (1) to separately estimate the priceearnings multiple both prior and subsequent to the recognizing firms’ announcements to
voluntarily adopt the recognition provisions of SFAS 123:
MVEit = α0 + α1Eit + α2DPi + α3Eit*DPi + εit

(2)

where
DPi

= an indicator variable equal to 1 for the first fiscal year ending after the
announcement to adopt the fair value method was made; DPi equals 0 for the last
fiscal year ending before the announcement; and

all other variables are as previously defined.
Based on H1, we expect the increase in the price-earnings multiple from the preannouncement period to the post-announcement period, α3, to be positive. To control for the
possibility that α3 simply captures a differential price-earnings multiple between years, however,
and not the effect of announcements to voluntarily adopt the fair value method of accounting for
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ESOs, we identify a control set of firms that did not make such announcements and revise
equation (2) as follows:
MVEit = α0 + α1Eit + α2DPi + α3Eit*DPi + α4DSi + α5Eit*DSi + α6DPi*DSi
+ α7Eit*DPi*DSi + εit

(3)

where
DSi

= an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm announced the adoption of the fair
value method in 2002; DSi equals 0 otherwise; and

all other variables are as previously defined. For the control firms, we set DPi = 1 for the
first fiscal year ending after June, 2002 and DPi = 0 for the last fiscal year ending before July,
2002.6
A positive coefficient on Eit*DPi*DSi, α7, would be consistent with H1, and would be
helpful in ruling out other events (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation) as an explanation for the
recognizing firms’ increase in the price-earnings multiple.
Alternatively, we regress annual stock returns on earnings and the change in earnings to
test H1 using the earnings response coefficient as a measure of earnings quality. Following
Easton and Harris (1991), we begin by estimating the following model:
Rit = β0 + β1Eit + β2∆Eit + µit

(4)

where
Rit

= the market adjusted return using the equal-weighted market index for the
twelve month period ending three months after fiscal year end;

Eit

= income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in
accounting principles (annual Compustat data item IB) scaled by market value of

6

In sensitivity tests in which we exclude control firms with July through November yearends, the inferences based
on the results reported in Tables 3 and 4 do not change.
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equity at the end of the third month after year t-1 fiscal year end (monthly
Compustat data item MKVALM);

∆Eit

= the change in income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and
changes in accounting principles from year t-1 (annual Compustat data item IB)
scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third month after year t-2 fiscal
year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM); and

µit

= random disturbance term.

Next, consistent with equation (2), we revise equation (4) to separately estimate the
earnings response coefficient both prior and subsequent to the recognizing firms’ announcements
to voluntarily adopt the recognition provisions of SFAS 123:
Rit = β0 + β1Eit + β2∆Eit + β3DPi + β4Eit*DPi + β5∆Eit*DPi + µit

(5)

where all variables are as previously defined. Positive coefficients on Eit*DPi and ∆Eit*DPi, β4
and β5, respectively, would be consistent with H1; i.e., the recognizing firms experience an
increase in perceived earnings quality after the announcement to voluntarily adopt the fair value
method of accounting for ESOs.
Consistent with equation (3), we also estimate the following model to compare the
recognizing firms to the control set of firms that did not announce the intent to voluntarily adopt
the SFAS 123 recognition provisions in 2002:
Rit = β0 + β1Eit + β2∆Eit + β3DPi + β4Eit*DPi + β5∆Eit*DPi + β6DSi
+ β7Eit*DSi + β8∆Eit*DSi + β9DPi*DSi + β10Eit*DPi*DSi
+ β11∆Eit*DPi*DSi + µit

(6)

where all variables are as previously defined. We test whether β10 > 0 and whether β11 > 0; i.e.,
whether the recognizing firms’ increases in earnings response coefficients are greater than the
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corresponding increases for the control firms. These results would be consistent with our first
hypothesis (H1) that the recognizing firms experienced an increase in perceived earnings quality
after the announcement to voluntarily recognize ESO expense according to SFAS 123.
To test our second hypothesis that recognizing firms using the present value method to
value ESOs in their proxy statements experience a greater increase in perceived earnings quality
than those firms using the potential realizable value method for this purpose, we modify
equations (2) and (5) as follows:
MVEit = α0 + α1Eit + α2DPi + α3Eit*DPi + α4FVi + α5Eit*FVi + α6DPi*FVi
+ α7Eit*DPi*FVi + εit

(7)

Rit = β0 + β1Eit + β2∆Eit + β3DPi + β4Eit*DPi + β5∆Eit*DPi + β6FVi + β7Eit*FVi
+ β8∆Eit*FVi + β9DPi*FVi + β10Eit*DPi*FVi + β11∆Eit*DPi*FVi + µit

(8)

where
FVi

= an indicator variable equal to 1 if the company uses a fair value option pricing
model to value ESO grants disclosed in its proxy statement (Black Scholes or
binomial method); FVi equals 0 if the company uses an alternate option pricing
model in its proxy statement; and

all other variables are as previously defined.
We test whether α7 > 0 in equation (7) and in equation (8) we test whether β10 > 0 and
whether β11 > 0. These tests provide evidence regarding whether the recognizing firms that
previously used the fair value method for proxy statement disclosure purposes experienced
greater increases in their price-earnings multiples and earnings response coefficients than firms
that had not used the fair value method for proxy statement purposes.
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IV. Sample Selection
The purpose of this study is to examine the perceived earnings quality implications of the
recognizing firms’ announcements to voluntarily adopt the fair value method of accounting for
stock-based compensation during the period between July and December 2002. A search of
corporate press releases and business news articles on the Dow Jones News Services Database
(now Factiva) results in a potential sample of 150 recognizing firms. As depicted in Figure 1,
the majority of recognizing firms made announcements to voluntarily recognize stock-based
compensation expense in July and August of 2002. Specifically, 30 firms made announcements
in July, and 64 firms made announcements in August. The remaining 56 announcement dates
occurred fairly evenly in the remaining period September through December 2002.
Because the focus of this study is on financial reporting issues under U.S. GAAP, nine
foreign firms (18 firm-years) were excluded to avoid inconsistencies in financial reporting. An
additional five firms (10 firm-years) were eliminated due to data unavailability resulting from the
occurrence of mergers, restatements, or bankruptcy filings during the pre- and postannouncement periods. Finally, we exclude three firms that changed yearends during the pre- or
post-announcement periods. Including these firms would have resulted in using inconsistent
earnings measures during our test period.
The resulting sample of 133 recognizing firms (266 firm-years) consists of 44 firms that
implemented the fair value method beginning in fiscal 2002, 83 firms that planned to implement
the fair value method starting in fiscal 2003, and six firms that postponed implementation until
fiscal 2004.7 Because we test the hypothesis that the recognizing firms’ announcements to adopt
the SFAS 123 recognition provisions, not the actual recognition of ESO expense in the income
7

When we compare just the 2002 implementers to the control firms in the estimations of equations (3) and (6), our
results fail to support both H1 and H2. This result could be due to low number of recognizing firm-years in our test
samples.
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statement, signals higher earnings quality, we use income before changes in accounting
principles as our earnings measure to ensure that recognized SFAS 123 ESO expense is excluded
in the post-announcement period firm-years. Doing so makes post-announcement earnings for
the 2002 implementers comparable to earnings for all other firm-years.
Our test samples are determined as follows. For purposes of the tests using the priceearnings multiple as a surrogate for earnings quality, 7 firm-years with missing data and 39 firmyears with losses were excluded, reducing the recognizing firm sub-sample from 266 to 220
firm-years.8 This subsample is further reduced to 205 firm-years when observations that result in
a studentized residual greater than two in the estimation of equation (3) are deleted. When the
earnings response coefficient is used as a proxy for earnings quality, 17 firm-years with missing
data are eliminated, resulting in a recognizing firm sub-sample of 249 firm-years. Four firmyears that result in a studentized residual greater than two in the estimation of equation (6) are
deleted, resulting in a sub-sample of 245 firm-years.9
Following ABK (2004a), we identify a control group consisting of all firms from the
S&P 500, S&P 400 mid-capitalization, and S&P 600 small-capitalization indices that did not
announce plans to voluntarily adopt the SFAS 123 recognition provisions during 2002 and have
data available on Compustat necessary to perform our tests.10 After deleting influential
observations based on studentized residuals greater than two in the estimation of equations (3)
and (6), respectively, this selection process results in control samples of 2,131 firm-years for our

8

Firm years in which net losses are reported are eliminated from the sample because prior research (eg. Collins,
Pincus, and Xie, 1999) shows that the relation between stock price and earnings is different for profitable versus loss
firms, and that the stock price of the latter firms is driven by the book value of equity.
9
Consistent with ABK (2004a), a substantial percentage of the recognizing firms are from the financial institutions
industry (SIC one-digit code = 6). Specifically, 109 firm-years (53 percent) and 120 firm-years (49 percent) in the
price-earnings multiple and earnings response coefficient test samples, respectively, are from this industry. When
we re-estimate equations (3) and (6) excluding these firms, our results fail to support either H1 or H2.
10
ABK (2004a) also restrict their control group to firms that disclosed SFAS 123 in the footnotes and to industries
matching at least one firm in the recognizing sample. We do not impose these restrictions..

16

price-earnings multiple tests in which loss-year observations are excluded, and 2,582 firm-years
for our earnings response coefficient tests in which loss-year observations are retained.11 This
sample selection process is summarized in Table 1. All variables are winsorized at the extreme
1st and 99th percentiles.
V. Results
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics separately for the recognizing firm sub-sample
(DSi=1) and the non-recognizing firm control group (DSi=0). The recognizing firm sub-sample
means and medians for both earnings (Eit) and market value of equity (MVEit) are significantly
greater than the corresponding means and medians for the control group of firms. These results
suggest that the recognizing firms, which are more profitable and larger than the control firms,
have more ability to take the hit to earnings resulting from expensing ESOs. Interestingly, the
debt to equity ratio, a proxy for debt covenant constraints, mean and median are significantly
greater for the recognizing firm sub-sample than the corresponding mean and median for the
control group of firms. There is no statistical difference in stock returns (Rit) or change in
earnings (∆Eit) between the two groups.
Table 3 reports the results of testing H1 using the price-earnings multiple as a proxy for
earnings quality. The first column in Table 3 reports the results of regressing the market value of
equity on earnings, equation (1), for the recognizing firm sub-sample, resulting in a priceearnings multiple of 8.8129 (two-tailed p<0.001). The second column of Table 3 reports the
results of estimating equation (2) for the recognizing firm sub-sample. Consistent with H1, the
coefficient on Eit*DPi is positive (coefficient estimate = 0.8049) and statistically significant
(two-tailed p=0.089). This result suggests that firms’ announcements to adopt the fair value
11

Our results are sensitive to the exclusion of influential observations. When we include these influential
observations in our test samples, our results generally fail to support either H1 or H2.
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method of accounting for stock-based compensation are associated with an increased priceearnings multiple in the post-announcement period, consistent with the hypothesis that
announcements to recognize ESO expense signal higher earnings quality. The final column of
Table 3 reports the results of estimating equation (3) for the full sample, which includes the
control set of firm-years that did not announce plans in 2002 to recognize ESO expense using the
fair value method. The coefficient on Eit*DPi*DSi is significantly greater than zero (coefficient
estimate = 1.0908; two-tailed p=0.065), consistent with an increased price-earnings multiple for
the recognizing firms relative to the control firms. This result helps rule out the alternative
explanation that the increased price-earnings multiple for the recognizing firms is due to other
events occurring during this time period.
Table 4 reports the results of testing H1 using the earnings response coefficient as the
surrogate for earnings quality. The first column reports the results of estimating equation (4) for
the recognizing firm sub-sample. The coefficient on earnings (Eit) is significantly positive (twotailed p<0.001), but the coefficient on the change in earnings (∆Eit) is insignificant (two-tailed
p=0.212). The second column of Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (5) for the
recognizing firm sub-sample. These results reflect a significantly positive incremental
coefficient on Eit*DPi (coefficient estimate = 0.6233; two-tailed p=0.003) but not ∆Eit*DPi (twotailed p=0.234). This latter result is not surprising given that the coefficient on ∆Eit is
insignificant in the across-year (column one) estimation. The last column of Table 4 reflects the
results of estimating equation (6). In this estimation, the coefficient on Eit*DPi*DSi is
insignificant (two-tailed p=0.651), but the positive coefficient on ∆Eit*DPi*DSi, 0.2747, is
significantly different from zero (two-tailed p=0.065). The results indicate that after controlling
for the pre- and post- announcement period effects, the recognizing firms (DS=1) have an
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incremental increase in value relevance of earnings changes but not earnings levels relative to the
control firms (DS=0). Overall, the earnings response coefficient test results reported in Table 4
are consistent with the hypothesis that the recognizing firms had an increase in perceived
earnings quality after the announcements to recognize ESO expense using the fair value method.
Taken together, both the price-earnings multiple and earnings response coefficient test results are
consistent with the hypothesis that the recognizing firms’ announcements to adopt the SFAS 123
recognition provisions increased their perceived earnings quality.
We now turn our discussion to the test of our hypothesis (H2) that recognizing firms that
previously used the fair value method in their proxy statement ESO disclosures have a greater
increase in earnings quality than the recognizing firms that use the potential realizable value
method in their proxy statements. In the sample of recognizing firms, 61, or 46%, used a fair
value method in their proxy statement ESO disclosures. The results of estimating equation (7)
are reported in Table 5, Panel A. Inconsistent with H2, when using the price-earnings multiple
as a proxy for earnings quality, the coefficient on Eit*DPi*FVi is insignificant (two-tailed
p=0.770). Likewise, as reported in Panel B of Table 5, when using the earnings response
coefficient as the earnings quality surrogate, neither the coefficient on Eit*DPi*FVi nor

∆Eit*DPi*FVi in the estimation of equation (8) is significantly differently from zero. Overall, the
estimation results reported in Table 5 do not support H2; i.e., we provide no evidence consistent
with the hypothesis that the recognizing firms that previously used the fair value method for
proxy statement disclosure purposes had a greater increase in perceived earnings quality than
those recognizing firms not using the fair value method for such purposes.
We next perform a sensitivity test based on the ABK (2004a) finding that only those
firms that announced plans to voluntarily recognize ESO expense early (July, 2002 announcers)
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experienced significantly positive announcement period returns. To provide evidence on
whether early announcers experience greater increases in earnings quality than late announcers,
we modify equations (2) and (5) as follows:
MVEit = α0 + α1Eit + α2DPi + α3Eit*DPi + α4EARLYi + α5Eit*EARLYi
+ α6DPit*EARLYi + α7Eit*DPi*EARLYi + εit

(9)

Rit = β0 + β1Eit + β2∆Eit + β3DPi + β4Eit*DPi + β5∆Eit*DPi + β6*EARLYi
+ β7Eit*EARLYi + β8∆Eit*EARLYi + β9DPi*EARLYi + β10Eit*DPi*EARLYi
+ β11∆Eit*DPi*EARLYi + µit

(10)

where
EARLYi = an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm announced the switch to recognize
ESO expense in July of 2002; EARLYi equals 0 if the firm announced the
switch after July 31, 2002 and on or before December 31, 2002; and
all other variables are as previously defined.
The results of estimating equation (9) are reported in Table 6, Panel A. The coefficient
on Eit*DPi*EARLYi is not significantly different from zero (two-tailed p=0.999). Panel B of
Table 6 reports the results of estimating equation (10). Also inconsistent with the early
announcers having a greater increase in earning quality than subsequent announcers, the
coefficients on Eit*DPi*EARLYi and Et*DPi*EARLYi are not significantly different from zero
(two-tailed p=0.127 and 0.642, respectively). Overall, the results reported in Table 6 provide no
evidence that the early announcers experienced a greater increase in perceived earnings quality
than the late announcers.
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VI. Conclusion
Based on a sample of 133 firms that announced plans to voluntarily adopt the fair value
method of accounting for stock-based compensation between July and December 2002, this
study provides evidence that these recognizing firms experienced a significantly greater priceearnings multiple and earnings response coefficient in the post-announcement date period. This
study provides no evidence, however, that the recognizing firms using the fair value method in
their proxy statements experienced significantly greater increases in perceived earnings quality
in the post-announcement period than the firms using the potential realizable value method.
Our results provide evidence consistent with the recognizing firms’ announcements to
voluntarily recognize SFAS 123 ESO expense, an accounting choice that is conservative because
it results in the persistent understatement of net income relative to footnote disclosure, sending a
credible signal of earnings quality to market participants. This evidence thus contributes to the
voluntary accounting choice (e.g., Fields, Lys and Vincent, 2001) and conservatism (e.g., Ahmed
et al., 2002) streams of literature. Also, because the signal of earnings quality sent to market
participants involves recognizing an expense already disclosed in the footnotes, our evidence
adds to the literature addressing recognition versus disclosure (e.g., Bernard and Schipper, 1994;
Aboody 1997; Barth, Clinch and Shibano, 2003; ABK, 2004b). Finally, because our evidence
suggests that market participants perceive that firms expensing ESOs have higher earnings
quality, this evidence implies that investors prefer expensing of ESOs to footnote disclosure. We
thus contribute to the ongoing debate concerning accounting for stock-based compensation (e.g.,
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 1996; Espahbodi et al., 2002; ABK, 2004a; ABK, 2004b).
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FIGURE 1

Distribution of Announcement Month for Recognizing Firms
Full Sample, N=150
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Table 1
Sample Selection

Total firms
Less: Foreign firms
Less: Firms with no data available
Less: Firms with change in year end
Firms in sample
Firm-years (pre- and postannouncement years)
Less: Firm-years with missing data
Less: Firm-years with losses
Less: Influential observations3
Final sample

Earnings Quality Measure
Price-earnings
Earnings Response
Multiple
Coefficient
Recognizing
Control
Recognizing
Control
1
2
1
Firms
Firms
Firms
Firms2
150
1,411
150
1,411
(9)
---(9)
---(5)
---(5)
---(3)
(9)
(3)
(9)
133
1,402
133
1,402
266
(7)
(39)
(15)
205

2,804
(32)
(516)
(125)
2,131

266
(17)
---(4)
245

2,804
(89)
--(133)
2,582

1

Recognizing firms are those firms that announced plans to voluntarily adopt the fair value method
of accounting for stock-based compensation during the period between July and December, 2002
2
Control firms consist of all firms from the S&P 500, S&P 400 mid-capitalization, and S&P 600
small-capitalization indices that did not announce plans to voluntarily adopt the SFAS 123
recognition provisions during 2002.
3
Influential observations are defined as those observations with a studentized residual greater than
two in the estimation of equation (3) for the price-earnings multiple tests and equation (6) for the
earnings response coefficient tests.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Percentiles
Mean

Standard
Deviation

N
DS=1 –Recognizing firms
205
E
205
MVE
245
R
245
∆E
245
Debt/Equity
238
DSBCE
37
RSBCE

Minimum

2.1599*
35.0246*
-0.0360
0.0013
3.4789*
77.0979
14.5857

1.2942
15.8046
0.2631
0.0864
29.2059
179.5528
60.0992

0.0541
5.0475
-0.7265
-0.2807
-4.1484
0.0000
0.0120

DS=0 – Control firms
2,131
E
2,131
MVE
2,582
R
2,582
∆E
2,576
Debt/Equity

1.4347*
26.3043*
-0.0742
0.0026
0.6784*

1.0393
12.4899
0.2797
0.0808
2.9898

0.0541
5.0475
-0.7265
-0.2807
-70.8180

25th

50th

75th

Maximum

1.3572
25.4135
-0.2208
-0.0237
0.4090
1.0000
0.0910

1.9417*
33.7112*
-0.0586
0.0037
0.9272*
7.5930
0.4050

2.7812
42.0179
0.1185
0.0268
1.6234
53.0000
3.3000

6.2697
85.9653
0.6460
0.4397
455.3902
1,514.0000
365.0000

0.7347
17.3505
-0.2580
-0.0221
0.0635

1.2340*
24.6523*
-0.0828
0.0048
0.4354*

1.8692
33.5535
0.1139
0.0244
0.9382

6.2697
85.9653
0.7793
0.4397
59.4192

Notes to Table 2
DS is an indicator variable =1 if the firm is a recognizing firm and =0 if the firm is a control firm.
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual Compustat data item IB) scaled by the common
shares outstanding (annual Compustat data item CSHO) as of the beginning of the fiscal year.
MVE is the market value of equity three months after fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM) scaled by the common shares outstanding (annual
Compustat data item CSHO) as of the beginning of the fiscal year.
R is the market adjusted cumulative return for the twelve month period ending three months after fiscal year end.
∆E is the change in income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles from year t-1 (annual Compustat data item
IB) scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third month after year t-2 fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM).
Debt/Equity Total long term debt (Compustat data item DLTT) divided by common equity (Compustat data item CEQ) at the end of year t.
DSBCE stock based compensation expense disclosed in the financial statements of the recognizing firms in millions of dollars.
RSBCE stock based compensation expense recognized in the financial statements of post-announcement period implementers in millions of dollars.
E, MVE, R, and ∆E are all winsorized at the extreme 1% and 99%. Observations that have studentized residuals >2 in estimating equations (3) or (6) are deleted.
* Mean or median is significantly different across the two groups at a two-tailed p <0.001.
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Table 3
Effect of Announcing the Adoption of the Fair Value Method of Accounting for Stock Options on the Price-earnings Multiple
Dependent variable is the Scaled Market Value of Equity (MVE)

Intercept
E
DP
E*DP
DS

Coefficient Estimates (two-tailed p-values)
Recognizing firms only
Recognizing and control firms
n=205 firm years
n=2,336 firm years
15.9894
20.4322
14.8242
17.7059
15.0189
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
8.8129
8.5300
8.1739
8.3554
7.8676
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
-9.1902
-5.9556
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
0.8049
-0.0936
(0.089)
(0.714)
1.0479
(0.261)

DS*DP
0.8296
(0.002)

E*DS
E*DP*DS
Adjusted R2

0.519

0.574

0.459

0.514

0.465

17.3683
(<0.001)
8.3951
(<0.001)
-4.8068
(<0.001)
-0.8287
(0.012)
2.0426
(0.101)
-3.1834
(0.082)
0.5956
(0.108)
1.0908
(0.065)
0.521
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Notes to Table 3
MVE is the market value of equity three months after fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM).
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual Compustat data item IB).
DP is an indicator variable =1 for the first fiscal year ending after the announcement to recognize SFAS 123 expense (June 2002) and =0 for the last
fiscal year ending before the announcement (July 2002) for the recognizing (control) firms.
DS is an indicator variable =1 if the firm is a recognizing firm and =0 if the firm is a control firm.
All variables, except the indicator variables, are scaled by the common shares outstanding (annual Compustat data item CSHO) as of the beginning
of the fiscal year.
E and MVE are winsorized at the extreme 1% and 99%. Observations with studentized residuals >2 from estimating equation (3) are deleted.
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Table 4
Effect of Announcing the Adoption of the Fair Value Method of Accounting for Stock Options on the Earnings Response
Coefficient
Dependent Variable is Stock Returns (R)

Intercept
E

∆E
DP
E*DP

∆E*DP
DS

Coefficient Estimates and (two-tailed p-values)
Recognizing firms only
Recognizing and control firms
n=245 firm years
n=2,827firm years
-0.0976
-0.1513
-0.1129
-0.1155
-0.1142
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
1.3438
1.0383
1.3436
0.9029
1.3342
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
0.2381
-0.0956
0.2352
0.3725
0.2696
(0.212)
(0.722)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
(<0.001)
0.0986
0.0133
(0.002)
(0.193)
0.6233
0.7043
(0.003)
(<0.001)
0.1994
-0.1419
(0.234)
(0.016)
0.0210
(0.225)

DS*DP
-0.0269
(0.764)
-0.1022
(0.008)

E*DS

∆E*DS
E*DP*DS

∆E*DP*DS
Adjusted R2

0.212

0.288

0.168

0.185

0.170

-0.1131
(<0.001)
0.8980
(<0.001)
0.4137
(<0.001)
0.0051
(0.628)
0.7413
(<0.001)
-0.1924
(0.002)
-0.0164
(0.496)
0.0776
(0.027)
-0.0530
(0.601)
-0.1073
(0.007)
-0.1017
(0.651)
0.2747
(0.065)
0.188
29

Notes to Table 4
R is the market adjusted cumulative return for the twelve month period ending three months after fiscal year end.
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual Compustat data item IB) scaled by
market value of equity at the end of the third month after year t-1 fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM).
∆E is the change in income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles from year t-1 (annual
Compustat data item IB) scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third month after year t-2 fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item
MKVALM).
DP is an indicator variable =1 for the first fiscal year ending after the announcement to recognize SFAS 123 expense (June 2002) and =0 for the last
fiscal year ending before the announcement (July 2002) for the recognizing (control) firms.
DS is an indicator variable =1 if the firm is a recognizing firm and =0 if the firm is a control firm.
R, E, and ∆E are winsorized at the extreme 1% and 99%. Observations with studentized residuals >2 from estimating equation (6) are deleted.
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Table 5
Incremental Effect of Consistency in Stock Option Value Disclosures
Panel A – Price-earnings Multiple – Dependent Variable is MVE
Intercept
E
DP
E*DP
FV
FV*DP
E*FV
E*DP*FV
Adjusted R2
N

Coefficient Estimate
19.7528
7.6003
-7.2706
0.8310
2.7947
-3.7395
1.4617
-0.4518

Two-tailed p-value
<0.001
<0.001
0.002
0.120
0.437
0.407
0.312
0.770

0.586
201
Notes to Table 5 Panel A

MVE is the market value of equity three months after fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM).
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual
Compustat data item IB).
DP is an indicator variable =1 for the first fiscal year ending after the announcement to recognize SFAS 123 expense
(June 2002) and =0 for the last fiscal year ending before the announcement (July 2002) for the recognizing (control)
firms.
FV is an indicator variable =1 if the company previously used a fair value option pricing model in its proxy
statement (Black Scholes or binomial method). FV = 0 if the company used an alternate option pricing model in its
proxy statement (Potential Realizable Value method).
All variables, except the indicator variables, are scaled by the common shares outstanding (annual Compustat data
item CSHO) as of the beginning of the fiscal year.
E and MVE are winsorized at the extreme 1% and 99%. Observations with studentized residuals >2 from estimating
equation (3) are deleted.
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Table 5 (Continued)
Panel B – Earnings Response Coefficient – Dependent Variable is R
Intercept
E
∆E
DP
E*DP
∆E*DP
FV
FV*DP
E*FV
∆E*FV
E*DP*FV
∆E*DP*FV
Adjusted R2
N

Coefficient Estimate
-0.0755
0.6385
0.5961
0.0297
0.7958
-0.0451
-0.1544
0.1631
1.1527
-0.8994
-1.0827
-0.1184

Two-tailed p-value
0.029
0.051
0.147
0.487
0.003
0.848
0.003
0.015
0.057
0.023
0.130
0.883

0.307
241
Notes to Table 5 Panel B

R is the market adjusted cumulative return for the twelve month period ending three months after fiscal year end.
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual
Compustat data item IB) scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third month after year t-1 fiscal year end
(monthly Compustat data item MKVALM).
∆E is the change in income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting
principles from year t-1 (annual Compustat data item IB) scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third
month after year t-2 fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM).
DP is an indicator variable =1 for the first fiscal year ending after the announcement to recognize SFAS 123 expense
(June 2002) and =0 for the last fiscal year ending before the announcement (July 2002) for the recognizing (control)
firms.
FV is an indicator variable =1 if the company previously used a fair value option pricing model in its proxy
statement (Black Scholes or binomial method). FV = 0 if the company used an alternate option pricing model in its
proxy statement (Potential Realizable Value method).
R, E and ∆E are winsorized at the extreme 1% and 99%. Observations with studentized residuals >2 from
estimating equation (6) are deleted.
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Table 6
Incremental Effect of Early versus Late Announcers
Panel A – Price-earnings Multiple – Dependent Variable is MVE
Intercept
E
DP
E*DP
EARLY
EARLY*DP
E*EARLY
E*DP*EARLY
Adjusted R2
N

Coefficient Estimate
20.4309
8.3667
-8.0579
0.6248
0.0250
-2.9084
0.4633
-0.0015

Two-tailed p-value
<0.001
<0.001
0.001
0.441
0.993
0.525
0.358
0.999

0.570
205
Notes to Table 6 Panel A

MVE is the market value of equity three months after fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM).
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual
Compustat data item IB).
DP is an indicator variable =1 for the first fiscal year ending after the announcement to recognize SFAS 123 expense
(June 2002) and =0 for the last fiscal year ending before the announcement (July 2002) for the recognizing (control)
firms.
EARLY is an indicator variable =1 if the company announced the switch in July of 2002. EARLY = 0 if the company
announced the switch after July 31, 2002 and before December 31, 2002.
All variables, except the indicator variables, are scaled by the common shares outstanding (annual Compustat data
item CSHO) as of the beginning of the fiscal year.
E and MVE are winsorized at the extreme 1% and 99%. Observations with studentized residuals >2 from estimating
equation (3) are deleted.
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Table 6 (Continued)
Panel B – Earnings Response Coefficient – Dependent Variable is R
Intercept
E
∆E
DP
E*DP
∆E*DP
EARLY
EARLY*DP
E*EARLY
∆E*EARLY
E*DP*EARLY
∆E*DP*EARLY
Adjusted R2
N

Coefficient Estimate
-0.1701
1.4124
-0.3643
0.0866
0.5211
0.3132
0.0530
0.2592
-1.3259
1.2237
-1.8618
-0.6596

Two-tailed p-value
<0.001
<0.001
0.202
0.012
0.014
0.065
0.385
0.018
0.034
0.301
0.127
0.642

0.324
245
Notes to Table 6 Panel B

R is the market adjusted cumulative return for the twelve month period ending three months after fiscal year end.
E is income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting principles (annual
Compustat data item IB) scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third month after year t-1 fiscal year end
(monthly Compustat data item MKVALM).
∆E is the change in income before extraordinary items, discontinued operations, and changes in accounting
principles from year t-1 (annual Compustat data item IB) scaled by market value of equity at the end of the third
month after year t-2 fiscal year end (monthly Compustat data item MKVALM).
DP is an indicator variable =1 for the first fiscal year ending after the announcement to recognize SFAS 123 expense
(June 2002) and =0 for the last fiscal year ending before the announcement (July 2002) for the recognizing (control)
firms.
EARLY is an indicator variable =1 if the company announced the switch in July of 2002. EARLY = 0 if the company
announced the switch after July 31, 2002 and before December 31, 2002.
R, E and ∆E are winsorized at the extreme 1% and 99%. Observations with studentized residuals > 2 from
estimating equation (6) are deleted.

34

